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IN JANUARY 2005, after nearly three years of work, the Task 
Force for ELCA Studies on Sexuality released its report and its 
three recommendations concerning the church’s policies relat-
ing to same-sex couples. From this report, the Church Council 
developed three resolutions, which were made public in April; 
two of these matched the recommendations of the task force, 
but the third differed. In August the Churchwide Assembly 
acted on these resolutions and the multiple amendments and 
substitute motions that were proposed from the floor. The first 
two resolutions were affirmed by the Assembly (the second with 
an amendment of wording, the effect of which was variously 
interpreted); the third was defeated, as were all of the substitute 
motions advanced by voting members. These dry facts give no 
hint of the turmoil, at the level of both intellectual exchange 
and practical maneuvering, that has characterized the ELCA 
since the 2001 Churchwide Assembly placed these disputes 
near the top of the agenda of our church. As a member of that 
task force, I have been invited to reflect on what “lessons for 
the church’s educational mission” might be derived from this 
experience. Perhaps counterintuitively, I would like to focus on 
what might be learned about peace. 
If furthering “peace in all the world” is part of the mission 
of the church, then it is also the mission of Lutheran colleges 
and universities. We all, I suspect, carry around in our minds 
some very sentimental and romanticized notions of peace, 
notions that make it difficult to imagine that the controversy, 
anger, and alienation swirling around Lutheran teachings and 
policies relating to same-sex couples could be at all relevant to a 
ministry of peace, except as exemplifying its absence. Yet if we 
equate peace with the absence of disagreement, then truly there 
could be no peace, and all efforts to promote it would be futile. 
I would like to propose that we try, inspired by this passage 
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A Church, the Human Condition,  
and the Fissured Face of Peace1 
But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near by the blood of Christ. For 
he is our peace; in his flesh he has made both groups into one and has broken down the dividing wall, 
that is, the hostility between us.
—Ephesians 2:13, 14
To fulfill these purposes, this church shall: . . . Study social issues and trends, work to discover 
the causes of oppression and injustice, and develop programs of ministry and advocacy to further 
human dignity, freedom, justice, and peace in all the world.
—ELCA Constitution, sec. 4.03.1
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from Ephesians, to equate peace, instead, with the absence of 
hostility and violence (and that we construe “violence” broadly 
as coercive force). Margaret Payne and James Childs quoted this 
scriptural text at the end of the letter with which they submitted 
the task force recommendations to the Church Council. Above 
their signatures, the letter closed, “In Christ’s peace.”
My theme, then, is “the fissured face of peace”—and by this 
I mean to invoke a rock face that is cleft, cracked, and broken. I 
dislike postmodern jargon, but “fissured” is one of the terms that 
I have found very helpful. “Fissures” point to contradictions, 
silences, disconnects, discontinuities, conflicts, and disagree-
ments; but the important thing about fissures is that they do not 
go all the way through whatever medium (face) they disrupt.
When the task force was created, many expected—or at least 
hoped—that it would, by diligent and careful study, listen-
ing, and reasoning, produce peace in the church by supplying 
final and definitive answers to the questions at the heart of the 
controversy. The church longed for the restoration of tranquility 
and appointed a task force to achieve that. Not surprisingly, in 
the months after the task force report became public, consider-
able disappointment and criticism were voiced because the task 
force had not “settled the question.” In the first part of this 
article, I will review why the task force did not do what many 
had expected. The factors that account for the course the task 
force pursued involve us in reflection on the nature of moral 
controversies, the inevitability of change, and the ways in which 
communities undertake to deal with controversies, dissent, and 
challenges to received tradition and authority. While we may 
wish to think about all of these things in ways that draw upon 
the Christian and Lutheran understanding of our situation 
before God and before one another, we cannot think about 
them in isolation from a well-grounded understanding of the 
human condition, or the realities of (fallen) creation. To be 
careless on this point in our pursuit of peace is to end up chasing 
after some invention of our dreams. In the second section, then, 
I will draw upon Hannah Arendt’s incisive description of the 
human condition to highlight some of these indelible features of 
our creaturely being, and in the last section I will suggest some 
ways in which a deep and reverent understanding of the human 
condition might be accented in our colleges and universities, 
with the hope of enabling our graduates to disagree without 
hostility, to evaluate without hatred or condescension, to engage 
change in positive and constructive ways, and to embrace in 
hope and courage the difficult work of making our views more 
true, our judgments more reliable, and our institutions more 
humane and just.
Reasons for not “settling the question”
It is probably fair to say that the report pleased no one. Those 
who were not particularly invested in these questions either way 
were discouraged and disappointed to find that no final word had 
been spoken to end what has developed into a bitter controversy. 
They had been hopeful that there would be a definitive resolution 
one way or another that would, as they often put it, allow the 
church to “move on” and redirect its energy and passion toward 
other urgent concerns such as economic justice, the deteriorat-
ing situations in the Middle East and the Sudan, the health-care 
challenges we face in the United States, hunger and homelessness 
in our own country and in the world, and ecological degradation. 
The task force had been appointed to produce clarity and end a 
squabble, and since, as a practical matter, we did not do that, they 
judged that we had failed to fulfill the charge we were given.
Others saw the failure as a moral and theological one. To 
them, the report had the look of moral spinelessness—and it 
looked that way both to those who had hoped that the task 
force would affirm the existing policies and support their 
enforcement, and to those who had hoped that the task force 
would recommend revising those policies in the name of justice. 
In a list-serve e-mail released January 14, 2005 (the day after 
the report and recommendations were made public), Roy A. 
Harrisville III, Executive Director of Solid Rock Lutherans, 
condemned the report for failing to “reflect both the bibli-
cal faith of millions and the desire for a clear word from our 
Church leadership.” Focusing on the third recommendation, he 
wrote, “With this recommendation, the Task Force has stated 
that sexual boundaries do not matter now, if they ever did.” 
From the other side, our work was faulted for elevating church 
unity over both truth and justice. Larry Rasmussen, a Lutheran 
ethicist writing in The Network Letter, was particularly force-
ful in his criticism on this point. The outcome of years of work 
by the task force was marked by an “absence of the spirit and 
courage of a church of the Reformation” (4). Noting Luther’s 
own confidence that “the living, active Word of God that suf-
fuses all creation can and might bring us all to a new place, as a 
church ever in need of reform,” he complained that “the daring, 
the venturesomeness, and the creativity that mark this joyful 
dynamic of Reformation freedom seem hedged about on every 
side in the Task Force report” (4). The task force had, in his view, 
“compromised the reformation” and “miss[ed] the chance to be 
Lutheran” (4, 5).
Lost in sin as we all are, it is more than possible that some 
or all of these negative assessments are accurate. Still, I cannot 
escape the sense that most of what has been written and said 
about our report fails to appreciate what may have been its most 
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important contribution: its effort to give substance and meaning 
to the notion of the church as a community of moral delibera-
tion. Of course, it is possible that we failed at that too, but that  
is a conversation that is still waiting to happen.
Moral judgments, moral conflicts
Moral conflicts arise out of the nature of moral judgment. All 
knowledge claims involve interpretation and judgment, even 
simple descriptions of fact and even empirical, scientific find-
ings. The role of judgment, or what Michael Polanyi calls the 
personal coefficient of knowledge, is more obvious and more 
dominant in the domains of religion, philosophy, and ethics than 
in other spheres of human inquiry and conviction. All judgments 
are subject to dispute by others who judge differently, but such 
contestations are much more widespread in moral and religious 
matters because (1) the realities in question are complex, difficult 
to isolate, and comparatively elusive; (2) more people feel that 
they know enough, on the basis of their own experience, to speak 
out with an authoritative voice; and (3) the issues at stake cut so 
incisively into their own action, self-understanding, and inter-
ests that people feel compelled by reason of their own integrity 
to defend their views and convictions. The important thing to 
understand here is that no amount of goodwill or education is 
going to banish moral and religious disagreement.
Yet not all moral conflicts are alike. Conflicts arise for differ-
ent reasons and the differences in cause have important implica-
tions for how, and even whether, the disagreement can be resolved.
1.  Some arise from inadequate understanding of the situation or 
defective reasoning about the situation. Conflicts of this sort 
are usually able to be resolved through education and careful 
critical analysis of the arguments offered by the opposing 
sides. Fortunately, the majority of our disagreements (moral 
and otherwise) are probably of this sort.
2.  Some arise because of deeper conflicts about underlying 
issues. These are harder to resolve because parties to the con-
flict first have to be brought to see that the ostensible subject 
of disagreement is not the actual subject of disagreement, and 
they then have to be willing to engage the conversation at the 
proper level.
3.  Some arise out of divergent judgments about the relative 
weight (or the proper ordering and balancing) of compet-
ing high-level values. Disputes of this kind can be impos-
sible to resolve (centuries of disagreement between pacifist 
Christians and Christians who condone the carefully 
regulated use of fatal force provide a familiar example here).
4.  Some arise from divergent styles of moral reasoning. Here 
we might think of conflicts between ethicists who reason 
primarily in terms of goals or ends and ethicists who reason 
primarily from prima facie duties.2  Or we might think of 
ethicists who start with Scripture and ask how it applies to 
experience and ethicists who begin with experience and ask 
how Scripture illuminates experience.
5.  Some, it must be admitted, arise from sin, pride, sloth, 
bigotry, self-indulgence, and other forms of self-centeredness, 
viciousness, or bad faith.
In the discussion that follows, I am going to disallow appeal 
to the fifth reason as a way of accounting for our current dis-
putes—though I notice that many people do appeal precisely to 
this explanation. I disallow it because (1) my own observations 
do not support it and (2) Christian charity requires that we put 
the best possible construction on the arguments of others.
The widespread disappointment reflects the fact that people 
thought this controversy was of the first variety—that it was a 
problem that could be resolved by concentrated study that would 
reveal what the church ought to do. I thought that myself when 
I began the work. But greater understanding has not yielded a 
resolution of this conflict; it actually seems sometimes to deepen 
the disagreement. Reflecting in his February 2005 newsletter 
on “What We’ve Learned about Ourselves” as a result of the 
years of study, Bishop Theodore Schneider noted that “there was 
a strong belief and hope across the church that if we all shared 
the same information we would be able to come to a consensus 
of agreement. Simply put, the problem was thought to be one of 
education.” The massive study efforts were not without effect. 
“We have learned a great deal about one another and, I believe, 
have come to a new appreciation of one another. But it does not 
appear that many minds were changed, just as the same appears 
to have been true on the Task Force itself.” And so, he concludes, 
another thing that “we have already learned is this: We may well 
live ourselves into change in this church and in our society, but 
we shall never argue ourselves into it” (2).
While study and education are hardly useless in the present 
case, it has become apparent that this controversy has deep and 
various roots, not all of which are actually ethical. I happen to 
have concluded that the controversy is primarily a controversy 
of the second sort and that the underlying issues are not actually 
moral or ethical at all, but for purposes of this article, it is not 
important whether the controversy is of the second, third, or 
fourth type. Whichever of these types it is, it is not a contro-
versy that a task force can “settle” for the church. This is partly 
because such conflicts sometimes do end at an impasse, but it is 
mostly because where such deep and responsible disagreements 
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arise, the church, as a whole community, must struggle toward 
a resolution. It cannot delegate that work to some subsidiary 
agency in the way that the work of study or fact-finding can be 
delegated. It was thus the considered judgment of the task force 
that time, forbearance, and widespread conversation would be 
required for this process to be carried through successfully—if 
it can be carried through at all. That was why we began by 
recommending that our church “concentrate on finding ways to 
live together faithfully in the midst of our disagreements.” Our 
second and third recommendations were offered as suggestions 
as to how the church might conduct itself as that continuing 
conversation unfolds.
Communities and their conflicts
Our recommendations notwithstanding, it is obvious that a 
number of different courses are open to a community when 
education and logical argument fail to persuade and produce 
one-mindedness or consensus. Not all of them are mutually 
exclusive, but only two of them seem conducive to the continu-
ing dialogue and mutual discernment that distinguish a com-
munity of moral deliberation.
The most typical response is probably the determination 
to overcome dissent by an exercise of power. It is possible (and 
sometimes, for the common good, necessary) to compel obedi-
ence where agreement cannot be won by argument. Whether the 
obedience one is compelling is obedience to traditional author-
ity, the law of the land, the will of a powerful elite, or the will 
of a voting majority, the method of resolution is the same. It is 
certainly the case that human communities cannot get on in an 
orderly way without such recourse to the exercise of power, but 
it does not follow that all fractious disagreements are best dealt 
with in this way. A defeated but unpersuaded faction can remain 
a source of significant discord. Moreover, in voluntary associa-
tions, compelling people to do things can get a little tricky. 
People are, after all, free to leave, and they often do.
Consequently, a true and final division of the house is 
another way of coping with deep and abiding disagreement. 
From its first meeting, the task force has been acutely aware that 
a significant number of current ELCA members believe that 
if other members cannot be brought to see moral truth as they 
do, the appropriate outcome would be the separation of ELCA 
Lutherans into smaller church bodies that are each more uni-
formly like-minded. If their interpretations and judgments do 
not prevail, those who believe that Scripture demands the affir-
mation and rigorous enforcement of current teachings and poli-
cies pertaining to sexual conduct appear to be prepared to leave 
the ELCA in order to form their own church. Should this occur, 
the congregations electing to remain identified as the ELCA 
would also constitute a more homogeneous church. In practice, 
this sort of redrawing of system boundaries is a common way 
of addressing intractable disputes in voluntary organizations, 
and in practice, this resolution often follows attempts to resolve 
disputes by an exercise of power. Of course, it should not be 
overlooked that an announcement by part of a community that 
they are moving toward separation is itself a fairly muscular exer-
cise of power. Neither should it be overlooked that “church shop-
ping” and the transition from “churched” to “unchurched” are 
other manifestations of this same phenomenon. Such maneuvers 
often seem more oriented toward comfort than toward peace 
(as the bitterness and disdain that afflict the newly established 
boundaries make plain). More importantly, if we habitually dis-
sociate ourselves from people who see things differently, we may 
actually diminish any possibility of rendering our views more 
nearly true.
In the face of conflict, some members of a community may 
respond by trying to de-escalate the issue, recasting it as one that 
does not matter, or at least does not matter as much as (or in the 
way that) others in the community think it does. On its surface, 
this may seem like an irresponsible or even malicious technique 
for buying peace by trivialization. Yet when bitter controversies 
are fed (intentionally or unintentionally) by incendiary rhetoric, 
false dichotomies, misrepresentation of contending arguments, 
and unrelenting focus on worst-case scenarios, it can be a work 
of grace to try to enhance the community’s sense of balance and 
proportion. Such efforts represent something quite different 
from relativistic laissez-faire, nor do they entail any abdication 
of principle. They are, on the contrary, strategies that may be 
essential to the restoration of the degree of community necessary 
to allow honest and principled moral deliberation.
It is also open to a community to intentionally choose to 
accommodate legitimate divergence (by which I mean well-
grounded, well-informed, principled disagreement) in order 
to continue together in conversation in the hope (perhaps only 
eschatological) that we may come to find some common ground. 
The period of accommodation may be comparatively brief and 
transitional or it may last for centuries. When Luther nailed his 
theses to the door, he was not proposing to split the community; 
he was inviting the community to talk together about difficult 
and contentious issues—to recognize its own divisions and try 
together to separate correctable corruption from legitimate 
dispute. The history of the Reformation and its aftermath 
teaches us how alien to human nature and to the infrastructure 
of human organizations this notion of accommodative, delibera-
tive peace actually is. On the Christian biblical understanding, 
peace is not, as John Macquarrie points out, a normative, static 
condition that is, from time to time, regrettably disrupted by 
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troublers of the communal equilibrium; rather, “peace is … a 
process and a task as man moves from potentiality to realiza-
tion” (19). Reflecting on Eph. 2:13, he continues, “When Christ 
bequeathed the gift of peace to his followers and when as the 
climax of the beatitudes he commended the peacemakers, we 
can see in retrospect that this was not the promise of tranquillity 
but the invitation to continue a costly work” (22). The work of 
peace is the work of reconciliation.
The task force, as a microcosm of our church, could have, 
after all its study, listening, and argument, tried to “settle the 
question” by taking a vote and declaring the majority victori-
ous and the majority’s views true. The task force did not do this, 
and in retrospect I have come to think that that was our most 
important contribution. I can make some guesses as to how such 
a vote would have turned out, but I truly do not know—because 
we never took it. We declined to exercise majority power out 
of respect for the conscience of those who, by reason of convic-
tion and integrity, found themselves to be of different minds. 
In offering our church the report and recommendations that 
we offered, the task force modeled its belief that we are a com-
munity, and that communities (1) should seek to operate by 
consensus and (2) in the absence of consensus, do best if they 
acknowledge and accommodate their conflicts rather than either 
denying them or allowing them to flare into feuds. 
Re-formation
Just as it is important not to identify peace with the absence of 
conflict, so it is important not to equate peace with stasis. We 
(the task force and the church at large) are in medias res—some-
where in the midst of one strand of the great, complex evolu-
tionary process of being the church under the call of a living 
God who moves and acts in history. This is always the case; the 
current situation simply highlights this for us.
I have heard many people frame the problem in terms of 
whether or not the church should change. The question is 
not whether to change, but how to change. Even if the 2005 
Churchwide Assembly had voted by an overwhelming majority to 
affirm existing teachings, practices, and policies and to uniformly 
enforce existing policies regarding lesbian and gay rostered 
ministers, the church would have changed. It would have become 
a church that, having scrutinized these teachings and all the 
reasons that people give for disagreeing with these teachings, had 
reaffirmed the teachings and policies in the face of that challenge 
and without concession to it. It would, by its very intentional 
act of reaffirming its received teachings, have become a church 
different from the church of thirty to fifty years ago in which the 
question simply did not come up because homosexual orientation 
was not acknowledged and same-sex couples were invisible.
Change can be good, neutral, or bad. Moreover, it can be 
all three at once—not just because different observers view it 
differently, but because the actual costs, burdens, and benefits 
of change fall differently on different sectors of a community 
and on different individuals. Change can be slow or rapid. Some 
favor slow change; others favor rapid change. The more one has 
invested in existing arrangements, the more one favors stability 
and (if change cannot be avoided) slow or evolutionary change—
thus, people often become more averse to change as they age, 
while the young sometimes seem to specialize in rebellion. There 
are many other good reasons not to proceed precipitously (not 
least among them the fallibility of human judgments about the 
right and the good), and institutional churches (as contrasted 
with more volatile and ephemeral religious movements) tend 
to move very deliberately. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that 
highly significant changes often occur long before they are 
acknowledged, producing a kind of institutional cognitive dis-
sonance or even something close to unintentional hypocrisy.
Social systems are extremely complex, and the impetus 
toward change tends to arise not from within a single compo-
nent of a given system but from the friction between systems, 
between a comprehensive system and one or more internal 
subsystems, or between subsystems within a comprehensive 
system. Moreover, systems tend to have porous rather than rigid 
boundaries, and people tend to be “resourced” by more than 
one system (that is, we all participate in multiple social systems 
and subsystems). Consequently, communal life and organiza-
tional systems are not characterized by unanimous agreement. 
The affective bonds of loyalty and need are probably at least as 
important in maintaining a cohesive social system as the bonds 
arising from cognitive agreement. Yet in strong and durable 
communities, there tends to be a strong, rich, and comparatively 
comprehensive consensus (though this consensus ought prob-
ably to be thought about more on the model of what we might 
call family relationships rather than on the model of universal 
accord on a few central beliefs).3
“Consensus” is a hard word to define, but it is pretty clear 
that our church, considered nationally and considered particu-
larly in light of the recorded votes of the Assembly, no longer 
has a strong consensus on the particular matter of just treatment 
of Lutheran same-sex couples in monogamous lifelong relation-
ships. Some on the task force felt that there is no emerging con-
sensus either. I, in contrast, suspect (partly on the basis of those 
votes at Churchwide Assembly4) that we are in fact seeing the 
slow emergence of a new consensus, but if so, it is still years away. 
In a just community, punishment of behaviors has to be backed 
and legitimated by strong consensus as to the unacceptability of 
the behavior in question; otherwise, the sanctions will seem to 
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many to be arbitrary, unfair, and discriminatory. In the absence 
of consensus, the task force recommended that policy should 
not be altered (implicitly, but not explicitly, acknowledging that 
policy alteration should reflect consensus in the community). 
However, the task force paired that respect for existing policy 
with recommendations that this church (1) undertake the kind 
of continuing dialogue that would allow either the emergence of 
a new consensus or a “repristinization” of the old consensus and 
(2) in the interim practice prudential deference and forbearance 
in the enforcement of policies that came about under a consen-
sus that no longer exists.
To the extent that ethics, policy, and leadership are always 
most fundamentally “about” the management of change, they 
demand great wisdom and discernment in differentiating among 
(1) what needs to be protected and preserved for the good of 
our common life, (2) what needs to be adapted or reinterpreted 
or renewed or reformed, and (3) what can be or needs to be 
relinquished or actively repudiated. As we have seen, the report 
and recommendations of the task force were bound to disap-
point those who considered the controversy to be resolvable 
by careful study. However, if one thinks instead that the task 
force was called to assist the church in addressing change and in 
responding as Lutherans to conscientious and principled dissent, 
the report and recommendations will seem, not necessarily more 
satisfying, but less like a default or evasion. In Journey Together 
Faithfully, Part 2, the task force exposed the degree to which 
the church itself has already changed by displaying the range of 
views held by faithful Lutherans—a portrait of the church that 
was validated many times over by the debate and actions of the 
Assembly. The recommendations themselves were built upon the 
belief of the task force that we, as a church, are not at this time 
able to clearly discern, with respect to this particular issue, what 
needs to be protected and preserved, what needs to be renewed 
or reformed, and what ought to be relinquished. Rather than 
urging false closure, the task force urged continuing conversa-
tion in which all voices will be heard.
Features of the human condition
In speaking about judgment, about change and temporality, 
and about the nature of social systems, I have already begun 
the exploration of our situation as creaturely beings, but to 
this I now want to add some specific insights from the work of 
Hannah Arendt. In The Human Condition, first published in 
1958 and continuously in print ever since, she begins with the 
indisputable observation that human beings are conditioned 
creatures; that is, we are the sort of creatures that exist in an 
environment on which we are dependent for our existence as 
the sort of creatures that we are. Although the conditions of 
our creatureliness “never condition us absolutely” (11), they are, 
nonetheless, the conditions of the possibility of our living and 
acting at all. We forget them or deny them at our peril. What, 
then, does she think these inexorable and empowering condi-
tions are?  “Life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plural-
ity, and the earth” (11). Although she herself does not write from 
a religious perspective, there is much that Lutherans can learn 
from her treatment of our terrestrial, creaturely being—and 
from her darker insight that although “the earth is the very 
quintessence of the human condition,” human beings “[seem] 
to be possessed by a rebellion against human existence as it has 
been given” (2). It is possible, as she acknowledges, that science 
and technology are in the process of actively altering the human 
condition itself, but if we do not even know what it is that we 
are altering (and she identifies “thoughtlessness” as “among the 
outstanding characteristics of our time” [5]), we can hardly make 
reliable judgments about the direction or the consequences of 
that process. But leaving aside the question of whether human 
beings can, in fact, alter the very conditions and limits of our 
own conditioning reality, she confines herself “to an analysis of 
those general human capacities which grow out of the human 
condition and are permanent, that is, which cannot be irretriev-
ably lost so long as the human condition is not changed” (6).
Life and earth require little explanation, but the other four 
dimensions of the human condition require more elaboration. 
Natality and mortality capture “the [biological] conditions 
under which life has been given to man” (9). They can be gath-
ered together as the two dimensions of earthliness. These she calls 
“the most general conditions of human existence” (8). We are 
finite, embodied, limited, perspective-bound creatures who grow, 
change, reproduce ourselves, and eventually decay and die. We 
must labor to sustain the biological processes that maintain life. 
In these dimensions, the human condition is not different from 
the conditions of all animal life, although we differ from the ani-
mals quite remarkably in our ways of meeting these necessities.
Worldliness names the uniquely human capacity to create 
layers of reality that are not given with our biological condi-
tion: linguistic systems; laws and systems for their development, 
amendment, and administration; markets, wealth, and money or 
other media of exchange; electrical power grids and communica-
tion networks; industrial complexes; knowledge and methods of 
inquiry that can be recorded and transmitted across geographi-
cal and temporal boundaries; social trust and moral expecta-
tions—to name only a few of the most obvious. We dwell in a 
biological ecosystem, but we also dwell in a constructed “world” 
of artefacts (Manhattan was not carved out of rock by natural 
forces) and in a transhistorical web of unspecifiably complex 
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mental, social, and operational systems. Worldliness comprises 
our own “self-made conditions, which, their human origin and 
their variability notwithstanding, possess the same conditioning 
power as natural things” (9).
Plurality is “the condition of human action because we are 
all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever 
the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live” (8). We 
lose sight of the extraordinary gift of being different—probably 
because so many of our most vexing problems arise out of this 
gift. Arendt urges us to appreciate the fact that the alternative to 
this would be a situation in which all human beings “were end-
lessly reproducible repetitions of the same model, whose nature 
or essence was the same for all and as predictable as the nature 
or essence of any other thing” (8). There would be no disagree-
ment, no conflict, no dissonance, no interhuman tension, no 
hierarchies, no equality (since that is distinct from sameness), no 
surprises, no change, no action properly so called, no history, no 
politics, no ethics, no evaluation, no failure, and no success. There 
would be general laws and predictable behavior, and that is all.
The full appreciation of the conditions of worldliness and 
plurality conveys an additional coloration upon the condition of 
natality. We are born as biological creatures requiring biological 
sustenance, but every infant arrives as a stranger and a poten-
tial actor capable of bringing about something new: “the new 
beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world 
only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning 
something anew, that is, of acting. In this sense of initiative, an 
element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all 
human activities” (9).
The church’s educational mission
Reflection on our creatureliness makes it hard to sustain the 
dream of perfect harmony as anything other than an eschato-
logical hope. It helps us to see why the only peace for which we 
can hope is fissured and unstable, a temporal possibility best 
understood, as Macquarrie has reminded us, as an endless, 
difficult, and costly process, not a situation or achievement. 
Understanding peace in this way, we might think together about 
how the “ministry and advocacy” of peace might be folded into 
our college’s educational mission as something other than pious 
exhortations to beat swords into plowshares and make war no 
more. We might begin by simply asking how the colleges can 
help to create a vibrant community of moral deliberation in 
which dividing walls are broken down, coercion is reserved for 
“last resort,” and inspirited care and respect crowd out recrimi-
nation and abuse.
Worldliness
“World” is through and through communal. The great articu-
late systems that constitute the fabric of our human lives are 
received through education. Education is the memory and the 
life and the future of these systems, and every educative object 
and event (every conversation, every examination, every book, 
every syllabus, every classroom exchange) both preserves the 
received system and changes it, forming the newcomers for their 
own work of preservation and reformation. Taking “worldliness” 
seriously not only enriches our understanding of the critical 
importance of what we do as teachers but also suggests that we 
might do well to centralize, perhaps as a feature of our general 
education curriculum, courses that explore the nature, function, 
meaning, indispensability, frictions, and operations of human 
social systems. Lutheran colleges might even facilitate Christian 
community by enabling their students to see the church as just 
such a social system (it may be far more than that, but it is most 
definitely at least that): a living community of word and action, 
not some sort of sea-bottom sedimentary “deposit of faith.” 
Courses that stress the interrelations of individuals and com-
munities (the dependence of individuals on their communities, 
the frictions between the individual and the community, the 
responsibilities of individuals for the preservation and adapta-
tion of their communities) might help our graduates not only to 
function better in the civic world but also to exercise more effec-
tive lay and professional leadership in the church itself.
Earthliness 
We are finite, limited, embodied, perspective-bound creatures 
who see partially and imperfectly. While we all offer lip service 
to this notion, left to our own devices most of us operate as if we 
were the sole possessors of truth and as if some neon light had 
gone on in the sky assuring us that our judgments are endorsed 
by God. If as educators we were to take our earthliness seriously, 
we would spend a lot more time helping our students understand 
that human moral and intellectual claims are judgments, not 
some kind of transcriptions of truth read off reality as we might 
copy out a passage from a book. And if we go out of our way to 
teach our students that human moral and intellectual claims are 
judgments, we must, of course, go even further out of our way 
to help our students make discriminations between judgments 
that are (comparatively) suspect and unreliable and judgments 
that are (comparatively) trustworthy and reliable. In the face of 
entrenched American anti-intellectualism and postmodern uni-
versalized suspicion, we must encourage respect for expertise and 
other forms of earned authority. But we must pair this emphasis 
on deference to legitimate authority and proven wisdom with 
companion emphasis on the responsibility to actively engage 
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that authority and wisdom patiently, critically, and discerningly. 
Conscience is not passively received; it is actively formed, and it 
is because it is so closely linked with personal integrity that we 
speak of it as inviolable (but not infallible). By way of the portal 
of conscience we can, as educators, reopen the discussion of tol-
erance, not as a political expediency, but as itself a fully defined 
virtue, an excellence grounded in a Christian understanding of 
creation and a bulwark against idolatry.
Mortality
We are temporal creatures in a temporal, historical world. The 
lives of persons, organizations, institutions, and civilizations 
have an arc that rises, peaks, and deteriorates. Nothing endures 
that does not change, and some things that change do not 
endure. For that reason, we might consider making it our goal 
to see that no student graduates with a bachelor’s degree from a 
Lutheran college without having developed a refined historical 
consciousness. Could we offer more courses in history—perhaps 
history across the curriculum?  Could we require more history 
or at least more courses that work historically?  We should do 
less comparing of snapshots (this was Rome, this was feudal 
Europe, this was the Renaissance) and more looking at histori-
cal change, the evolution of social systems, and their interplay. 
How did this group of people actually get from A to B?  While 
it certainly continues to be important to study religions in light 
of typological differences and to examine religious beliefs and 
practices on their own merits, could we do a better job of study-
ing Christianity as it changes over time?  Where this is done at 
all, it tends to be done as a study in the history of ideas, but we 
need also to study Christian beliefs, teachings, and practices as 
they change in relation to changes in economics, migrations, or 
political arrangements—and in relation to the social situation of 
the members of particular church bodies.
Natality 
Our students are the natal horde of newcomers, the strang-
ers who are only partially at home in the world that we have 
ourselves received, sustained, and remade. They both ardently 
seek assimilation into our world(s) and rebelliously resist it. We 
know them, at some deep level of our teacherly hearts, as both 
our hope and our enemy. If the things we treasure, and the fabric 
of memory and understanding that we represent and preserve, 
are to persist into the unfathomable future, they will have to be 
preserved and transmitted by these alternately sullen and recep-
tive, alternately passionate and indifferent, young people hidden 
under their baseball caps in the back row. These memories, these 
interpretations, these intentions will have to be adapted and 
nurtured by this rising generation as our generation has adapted 
and nurtured them. And these young people, as they take these 
gifts from our hands, will change, and perhaps discard, what 
we have spent our lives on, just as, in so spending our lives, 
we changed and sometimes lost, sometimes rejected what we 
received. The blessing in all this is that they will, in speech and 
action, renew and reconstruct these traditions as they make 
them their own.
Plurality  
There are six billion of us and we are all (despite the degree of 
our genetic similarity) remarkably different. We come from 
different social worlds; even within the same social world, 
people have different experiences depending on their race, their 
sexuality, their class and status, and innumerable other factors. 
We live in multiple social worlds and “speak” multiple symbolic 
languages. Lutherans are different from the unchurched and 
from other Christians; Lutherans are, let us not forget, different 
from Lutherans.
I would like to see Lutheran colleges make a concerted 
attempt to supplement our course offerings in the traditional 
study of epistemology with attentiveness to American prag-
matism and with careful and informed study of the sociology 
of knowledge. I have noticed over the years that scholars with 
religious commitments (and certainly religious leaders writing 
for broad publics) tend to demonize pragmatism and the sociol-
ogy of knowledge as subjectivistic and relativistic endeavors that 
undermine or deny the validity of moral judgments and human 
efforts to sort out truth from error. This represents a very unfor-
tunate misunderstanding of both American pragmatism and 
the serious attempts now underway to study human knowledge 
claims contextually. We are not obliged to choose sides between 
the spineless relativists and what William James called “absolut-
ism.” Scholars and scientists have been busy for a century and a 
half developing alternatives to this false dichotomy. However, if 
so many opinion-shapers have somehow overlooked this devel-
opment, it seems likely that we are not doing a very good job of 
teaching it. 
In addition, taking plurality seriously implies that we 
welcome conflict for what it is: testimony to our individual 
uniqueness and the wellspring of our freedom. Conflict and 
controversy are often signs of the health of a community, not 
an index of its decay (though if space permitted, it would be 
important to differentiate constructive conflict that builds up, 
adapts, and revitalizes a community from the kind of conflict 
that is implicated in the collapse of social systems). In any social 
system (or sub-system), the fundamental resources of the com-
munity include interpretations of reality that form the con-
ceptual framework and horizon of both thought and practice. 
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The inexhaustible richness of earth and world alike continually 
outruns or overflows any and every attempted human account. 
It is unquestionably the responsibility of educators to bring 
order to the “booming, buzzing confusion” of human experi-
ence. It is our responsibility to find the narrative threads that 
make the past meaningful. It is our work to identify patterns 
and to sort out the coherent from the incoherent. But we must 
be careful, even as we go about that work, to acknowledge the 
provisional evolving nature of our interpretations and to honor 
the human condition of plurality by equipping our students to 
deal resourcefully and fearlessly with change and variability. 
When human beings build systems (whether conceptual or 
social), there will always be anomalies—features of reality that 
cannot readily be fitted into the pattern. These anomalies are, 
usually in small ways but sometimes in major ways, threats to 
the integrity and sustainability of the system; fears, along with 
our deep desire for orderliness and control, more often than 
not lead us to “forget” or paper over or even falsify these signals 
of fragility and limitation. We want, instead, to inspire in our 
students the courage to acknowledge the anomalies and to read 
them accurately for what they can tell us about the limitations 
and vulnerabilities of our nonetheless indispensable convictions 
and social arrangements.
Coda
Conflict, disagreement, divergence in interpretation and judg-
ment concerning the true, the good, the beautiful, and the 
right—these are indelible features of the human condition and 
the fissures in the face of peace. We cannot make them disap-
pear. We should not even want to make them disappear, because 
they are part and parcel of our humanity, our creatureliness. 
We can, however, try to prevent them from becoming sources of 
destruction. We can try to prevent these fissures from turning 
into rifts and hostilities that break us apart and isolate us, one 
from another. We can try to prevent them from turning into the 
fractures and hatreds that destroy our peace.
The task force, in one small document, has offered our church 
our hope that this may be so. In a much larger way, over a much 
longer time, in more varied contexts, and possibly with much 
greater success, Lutheran colleges may also foster this hope. This, 
it seems to me, though I certainly see only “through a darkened 
glass,” is how the work and learnings of the task force might 
contribute to reflection on “the Lutheran calling in education.”
Endnotes
1. This article is derived from a paper titled “The ELCA Study on 
Sexuality: Lessons for the Church’s Educational Mission,” which was 
originally delivered July 31, 2005, at the conference The Vocation of 
a Lutheran College: The Lutheran Calling in Education, at Capital 
University in Columbus, OH. The conference was sponsored by the 
ELCA Division for Higher Education and Schools.
2. For an important argument that the apparent conflict of these 
distinctive ways of reasoning might be overcome by imaging the moral 
life interactionally in terms of man-the-answerer, see chap. 1 of   
H. Richard Niebuhr’s The Responsible Self.
3. I am regretfully aware of the inadequacies of this brief paragraph. 
For a full and very illuminating sociological discussion of social organi-
zation, see John Bowker’s rich and incisive essay “Religions as Systems.” 
For a political treatment of the notion of “overlapping consensus” 
(common ground achieved in relation to, or in spite of, continuing 
disagreements), see John Rawls’s Political Liberalism.
4. Fifty-eight percent of the voting members rejected a substitute 
motion reserving “the solemnizing and blessing of sexual unions. . . 
for the marriage of a man and a woman.” Thirty-eight percent voted in 
favor of a substitute motion that would have removed all policy barriers 
“to rostered service for otherwise qualified persons in same-gender, 
covenanted relationships that are ‘mutual, chaste, and faithful.’” The 
third resolution from the Church Council was affirmed by fully forty-
nine percent of those voting, even though it was opposed by Lutherans 
Concerned (because it routed the path to ministry through a process 
of applying to be considered an “exception”) and therefore probably 
lost the votes of some, perhaps many, who support the rostering of gays 
and lesbians in committed relationships. These votes would have been 
unimaginable even twenty years ago.
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